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T E POLITICAL FACE OF ANTITRUST
Spencer Weber Waller* Jacob E. Morse**
A STRACT
The last twenty years have brought antitrust back to the fore as a political
issue of greater salience. Several booms and busts in the economy have
highlighted the issue of corporate power in the economy and the political
system. The growing influence and aggressiveness of the European Union
and other jurisdictions’ competition laws have highlighted the relative
retreat in the United States. Political movements in the United States have
brought issues of corporate power and its abuse back into the public limelight
and with them a greater political salience for antitrust in the election cycle
of 2020.
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law is having a moment. After decades of languishing as a
relatively technical legal specialty, issues of corporate concentration, income
inequality, abuse of dominance and power, and the harms of lenient merger
policy have returned as issues of public discussion and debate.
The return of antitrust as a matter of political and public discourse is
welcome, but not surprising. United States antitrust law was born out of the
political turbulence that arose from industrialization of the national economy
in the second half of the nineteenth century, following the end of the Civil
War.1 Candidates ran for state and federal office under the banner of the AntiMonopoly and Populist Parties. 2 Political turmoil led to the enactment of
state,3 and then federal,4 antitrust laws. By 1912, the U.S. Presidential race
arguably turned on the differing antitrust visions of the three leading
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Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Reilly Dougherty for
additional research and Maciej Bernatt, John Breen, Darren Bush, Christine Chabot, Ted Janger,
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Competencia (Buenos Aires), Loyola University Chicago School, and the Yale Thurman Arnold
Project for their thoughtful comments. The preparation of this essay was supported by a summer
grant research from Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
** J.D. Expected 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION (1955); Overview and history of the antitrust laws, 1 Health Care and Antitrust L. § 1:3
(2020).
2. GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION AND
THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA 1865-1996 8–12 (1997).
3. See generally James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495
(1987).
4. See generally WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT 95–99 (1965).
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candidates.5 In the post-World War II era, both major parties supported the
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws and trumpeted that support in their
political platforms in Presidential campaigns.6
That tide began to ebb in the late 1970s and 1980s. At first, bi-partisan
deregulation gained support and then the Regan Revolution and the Chicago
School of Law and Economics eroded public and judicial support for antitrust
enforcement. 7 Antitrust law became lumped in the public view as part of
generally disfavored government regulation of the economy.
The last twenty years have brought antitrust back to the fore as a political
issue of greater salience. Several booms and busts in the economy have
highlighted the issue of corporate power in the economy and the political
system. The growing influence and aggressiveness of the European Union
and other jurisdictions’ competition laws have highlighted the relative retreat
in the United States.8 Political movements in the United States have brought
issues of corporate power and its abuse back into the public limelight and
with them a greater political salience for antitrust in the election cycle of
2020.
This Article examines the modern political face of antirust. First, we
discuss the numerous antitrust platforms, promises, legislation, hearings, and
investigations that have been introduced and discussed during the 2020
election cycle. Second, we survey some of the ways that antitrust issues have
become part of the public discourse. Finally, we celebrate this trend as good
for antitrust and the body politic.
I

CAMPAI N PLATFORMS AND POLICIES

The principal campaign promises and proposals by the leading
candidates in the 2020 Presidential election are a sign of the return of antitrust
as an important contemporary political discussion. Unlike recent past
elections, antitrust issues were front and center among the many Democratic
contenders in the 2020 primaries until Super Tuesday largely decided that
contest and the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the news cycle.9
5. See generally JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT AND DEBS—THE
ELECTION THAT CHANGED THE COUNTRY (2005).
6. See National Political Party Platforms, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (last visited Aug. 26,
2020), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/
national-political-party-platforms.
7. See generally ROBERT PITOFSKY, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (2008).
8. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Law, 52
CONN. L. REV. 123 (2020) (surveying the history of antitrust law in the United States and offering
comparisons with the European Union).
9. The COVID-19 pandemic also brought a host of new antitrust issues which are discussed in
current news cycles. Issues of COVID-19-related price gouging, for example, were almost
immediately discussed. See, e.g., Michael Levenson, Price Gouging Complaints Surge Amid
Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/
coronavirus-price-gouging-hand-sanitizer-masks-wipes.html; Stephanie Zimmerman, Illinois
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A SENATOR AMY KLO UC AR
Senator Amy Klobuchar centered many of her antitrust proposals around
merger reform. Klobuchar sought to clarify that existing antitrust laws
required agencies to take into account more than just possible effects on price
when reviewing a merger.10 Klobuchar also sought to increase the cost of
merger filing fees “so that merging parties of the largest deals start paying
their fair share.”11 Further, Klobuchar wanted to shift the burden of proof to
merging parties to show that their merger would not materially harm
competition.12
Senator Klobuchar, like many of the other 2020 candidates, also
proposed antitrust reform in the agribusiness sector. Klobuchar was
concerned with concentration in the agriculture industry and pledged to look
at recent large mergers and acquisitions.13 Klobuchar further pledged that she
would require the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) “to
collect and publish concentration information in agricultural markets and to
allow the USDA to participate in the review of proposed mergers in the
agricultural sector.”14
Senator Klobuchar’s flagship idea was the creation of the Office of
Competition Advocate (OCA).15 The OCA would be an arm of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC),16 headed by a Competition Advocate, who reports
directly to the Chairman of the FTC.17 The OCA would effectively be the
federal government’s antitrust thinktank. It would collect data on

attorney general calls for Amazon, other sellers to police coronavirus price-gouging, CHI. SUN
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2020, 6:14 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/coronavirus/2020/3/
25/21194411/illinois-attorney-general-raoul-coronavirus-price-gouging-sanitizer-masks-amazonfacebook-walmart; Geneva Sands & Priscilla Alvarez, Feds target price gouging as states and
hospitals swarm private market for supplies, CNN (Apr. 25, 2020, 12:09 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/25/politics/fema-doj-price-gouging-supplies/index.html.
10. See Amy Klobuchar, Senator Klobuchar’s Plan for the Future of Work and a Changing
Economy, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2019), https://medium.com/@Amy_Klobuchar/senator-klobucharsplan-for-the-future-of-work-and-a-changing-economy-4c7c0b859fec; see also John Delany’s Plan
for Antitrust Policy, JOHN DELANEY, https://www.johndelaney.com/issues/antitrust/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2020) (proposing policy that would “[i]nstruct the federal courts and the antitrust
enforcement agencies to also weigh long term market structure when reviewing a proposed
merger”).
11. Klobuchar, supra note 10.
12. Id. See also Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S. 307, 116th
Cong. § 2(b)(4) (2019).
13. Klobuchar, supra note 10.
14. Amy Klobuchar, Senator Klobuchar’s Plan from the Heartland: Strengthening our
Agricultural and Rural Communities, MEDIUM (Aug. 7, 2019), https://medium.com/
@Amy_Klobuchar/senator-klobuchars-plan-from-the-heartland-strengthening-our-agriculturaland-rural-communities-405cb6b3234d.
15. Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S. 307, 116th Cong. §
5(b) (2019); Klobuchar, supra note 10.
16. Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S. 307, 116th Cong. §
5(b) (2019).
17. Id. at § 5(c)(1)(A).
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anticompetitive activity—through coordination with other agencies and
subpoena power—and then publicly release such data, along with
recommendations to enforcement agencies on what action should be taken.18
While the OCA would lack formal enforcement authority, it would have the
authority to subpoena information that it was unable to obtain through
coordination with other agencies.19
SENATOR ERNIE SANDERS
Senator Bernie Sanders similarly centered his antitrust platform around
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. 20 Senator Sanders proposed
revisiting recent mergers and pledged to undo those that have highly
concentrated markets, harmed workers, raised prices, or are otherwise
anticompetitive. 21 He likewise pledged to break up any corporation that
attained dominant market share and could use its market power in an anticompetitive way.22
Senator Sanders also sought to use the FTC to study mergers and
acquisitions.23 Sanders proposed that the FTC study and identify common
anti-competitive business practices, and that any company engaging in such
behavior would not be able to obtain merger approval.24 The results of the
FTC’s study would be utilized to craft new, “bright-line merger guidelines
that set caps for vertical mergers, horizontal mergers, and total market
share.”25
Senator Sanders proposed to use the FTC in a way that no other candidate
had contemplated. Sanders proposed allowing the FTC to issue
administrative fines as well as the ability to halt mergers without first
challenging them in federal court.26 Further, Sanders sought to grant the FTC
18. Id. at §§ 5(e)–(g).
19. Id. at § 5(f)(1).
20. See generally Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com
/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
21. Senator Sanders was critical of mergers that have taken place under the Trump
administration, pledging to look at all mergers which have taken place since Trump took office.
Senator Sanders further proposed that the FTC review all mergers over the past 40 years to develop
new merger guidelines. Review All Mergers that Have Taken Place During the Trump
Administration,
BERNIE,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-anddemocracy/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (The Sanders plan would also end institutional deference to the consumer welfare
standard, and his plan instead cites to a paper from the Roosevelt Institute proposing a new standard:
the effective competition standard); See also Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The
Effective Competition Standard, ROOSEVELT INST. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/
effective-competition-standard/.
25. Review All Mergers that Have Taken Place During the Trump Administration, supra note
21.
26. Id. Sanders cites to a plan out of the Great Democracy Initiative. See Ganesh Sitaraman,
Taking Antitrust Away from the Courts, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE (Sept. 2018),
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full rulemaking authority under the Sherman, Clayton, and Packers and
Federal Trade Commission Acts. 27 Finally, the FTC would be directed to
prepare an annual report on the impacts of mergers across markets.28
Senator Sanders’ plans also addressed anti-competitive harms faced by
the agribusiness industry. Sanders proposed placing a moratorium on both
mergers and vertical integration of large agribusiness corporations.29 Sanders
further proposed reestablishing and strengthening the Grain Inspectors,
Packers, and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) in order to provide basic
protections to farmers dealing with big food companies. 30 Sanders also
pledged to pass a national “right-to-repair” law that would give farmers full
rights over the machines they buy, instead of being required to go to an
authorized repair agent.31
C SENATOR ELI A ET WARREN
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposals were perhaps the most
comprehensive of all the candidates. Warren proposed plans directed at
merger reform in the agribusiness sphere addressing consolidation in the
healthcare and technology industries, as well as plans to address labor and
antitrust law issues. Warren first proposed directing the FTC to block all
future mergers between hospitals unless the merging companies could show
that the merged entity can maintain or improve access to care.32 She likewise
proposed reforms to strengthen FTC oversight of the healthcare industry as
well as those that would require mergers involving healthcare centers be
reported to the FTC.33
Senator Warren further proposed several novel plans at the intersection
of antitrust and labor laws. First, Warren proposed amending the antitrust
https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Taking-Antitrust-Away-fromthe-Courts-Report-092018-3.pdf.
27. In the same vein, Sanders proposed repealing the rulemaking burdens imposed upon the FTC
by the Magnuson-Moss Act, as well as repealing the section of the Magnuson-Moss Act that states
that the FTC will be funded through appropriations, and rather, proposed that the agency would be
“granted reasonable fees to carry out its duties.” Review All Mergers that Have Taken Place During
the Trump Administration, supra note 21.
28. Id.
29. Policies Leveling the Playing Field for Farmers and Farmworkers, BERNIE,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/revitalizing-rural-america/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2020); Senator
(and then-candidate) Cory Booker was the first among presidential contenders to suggest placing a
moratorium on Big Food mergers. See Cory Booker, Cory Booker: A handful of companies make
most of our food. We need to end big food mergers, CNN BUS. (Jul. 25, 2019, 8:08 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/perspectives/cory-booker-antitrust-farmers/index.html.
30. Policies Leveling the Playing Field for Farmers and Farmworkers, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. Investing in Rural America, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/
plans/invest-rural (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
33. Additional reforms included authorization of the FTC to conduct reviews for anticompetitive behavior of hospitals, updating Department of Justice (DOJ) vertical merger guidelines,
and examining vertically integrated health care companies for anti-competitive practices. See id.
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laws to protect gig workers, currently classified as independent contractors,34
in order to allow them to bargain collectively or unionize. 35 Warren also
suggested that she would use existing authority to reject mergers that would
drive wages down.36 She finally proposed banning “no-poach” agreements
where competing firms refuse to recruit or hire each other’s employees.37
Senator Warren also had plans to address anticompetitive practices in the
agribusiness industry. Senator Warren committed to appoint “trustbusters” to
review—and reverse—anticompetitive mergers. 38 Recognizing the harms
caused by widespread vertical integration in the agribusiness sector, Warren
further committed to break up vertically integrated agribusiness companies
in order to give farmers more bargaining power when dealing with these
companies. 39 Senator Warren finally committed to supporting “right-torepair” legislation, as Bernie Sanders also proposed, as well as legislation
that would make federal checkoff programs voluntary.40
Most notably, Senator Warren released a comprehensive plan to break up
tech monopolies, which garnered a fair amount of press and national
attention.41 Warren’s proposal centers around a concept she terms “platform
utilities.”42 These are companies with an annual global revenue of $25 billion
or more that offer some sort of online marketplace, exchange, or platform for
connecting third-parties. 43 Such companies would be barred from owning

34. See generally What is a gig worker?, GIG ECON. DATA HUB, https://
www.gigeconomydata.org/basics/what-gig-worker (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
35. Empowering American Workers, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/
plans/empowering-american-workers (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
36. Id. Warren relies on a law review article for this proposal. See Suresh Naidu, Eric. A Posner
& Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537, 570 (2018).
37. Investing in Rural America, supra note 32. See also End Employer Collusion Act, S. 2215,
116th Cong. (2019).
38. Leveling the Playing Field for America’s Family Farmers, WARREN DEMOCRATS,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/americas-family-farmers (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
39. Id. (While Warren’s plan pledged to break up integrated agribusiness corporations, it did not
specify to what extent such companies would need to be vertically integrated in order for her
administration to break them up, nor did it make mention of integrated companies needing to engage
in anticompetitive behavior).
40. Federal checkoff programs require producers of certain products—including beef, pork,
eggs, chicken, and corn—to pay a portion of their sales into a federal checkoff program which is
used to fund advertising campaigns. Arguably, the money small business farmers pay into the
program eventuate in lobbying and advertising that benefit big agricultural companies. See, e.g.,
Leveling the Playing Field for America’s Family Farmers, supra note 38; OCM Staff, Top 10 Most
Egregious Checkoff Program Abuses, ORG. FOR COMPETITIVE MKT. (May 14, 2018),
https://competitivemarkets.com/top-10-most-egregious-checkoff-program-abuses/.
41. See, e.g., Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on Breaking Up Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-break-up-amazonfacebook.html; Lauren Gambino, ‘Too much power’: it’s Warren v Facebook in a key 2020 battle,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2019 8:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/19/elizabeth
-warren-facebook-break-up.
42. Elizabeth Warren, Here’s how we can break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c.
43. Id.
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both the platform utility and any participants on the platform, and would be
required to meet a standard of “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
dealing” with its users.44 Moreover, platform utilities would be prohibited
from transferring or sharing data with third parties. 45 Warren’s proposal
provided that federal regulators, State Attorneys General, and injured private
parties would have standing to sue a platform utility in order to enjoin
conduct in violation of her plan, to disgorge ill-gotten gains, and to be
awarded treble damages.46 Any company in violation of the requirements of
her plan would also be forced to pay a fine of 5 percent of annual revenue.47
D FORMER ICE PRESIDENT OSEP

IDEN

As the eventual Democratic Nominee in the 2020 general election, it was
somewhat surprising to see the former Vice President’s lack of any type of
concrete antitrust proposal. Biden’s campaign website included various
proposals, none of which squarely addressed antitrust issues. 48 Some of
Biden’s plans tangentially mentioned increased enforcement modification of
antitrust laws as a part of a greater economic vision, 49 but no plan was
focused primarily on antitrust, and certainly none as comprehensive as
several of Biden’s former competitors.
While Biden has recognized the dangers Big Tech poses to competition
and consumers in the United States, he has only made off-hand comments
related to antitrust enforcement particularly with respect to Big Tech, instead
of putting forth or endorsing any specific policy proposals.50
E OT ER DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE PROPOSALS
Among the remaining 2020 Democratic candidates, several others either
proposed additional ideas or agreed with ideas already proposed by other
candidates. Representative John Delaney proposed that he would instruct
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
See, e.g., The Biden Plan for Rural America, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/rural/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2020) (promising to protect small and medium farms from the harms of increased
market concentration through strengthening enforcement of the Sherman, Clayton, and the Packers
and Stockyards Acts); The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective
Bargaining, and Unions, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Oct.
25, 2020) (promising to modify antitrust laws to allow for independent contractors to organize and
bargain collectively).
50. When asked if he would support breaking up Big Tech, Biden stated, “I don’t think we spend
nearly enough time focusing on antitrust measures. And the truth of the matter is I think it’s
something we should take a really hard look at.” See Joe Biden says he’s open to breaking up
Facebook, CNBC (May 13, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/14/2020-hopeful-joebiden-says-hes-open-to-breaking-up-facebook.html. He went on to praise Elizabeth Warren’s
arguments for breaking up tech companies, however, he stopped short of endorsing Warren’s plan
outright, calling it “premature.” See id.
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federal courts to weigh long term market structure when reviewing a potential
merger,51 and further stated that he would “make it clear” that the Clayton
and Sherman Acts authorize the unwinding of previous mergers. 52 Mayor
Pete Buttigieg stated that he would lower reporting requirements for mergers
and revive an arm of USDA responsible for policing competition in the
agricultural marketplace. 53 Senator Cory Booker consistently criticized
consolidation in the agriculture industry and advocated for policies (and
legislation) that would address such concerns.54
F

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP

President Trump has yet to put forward a cognizable plan related to
antitrust. 55 In regard to Big Tech, President Trump has said that “there’s
something going on,” 56 but has not elaborated with any formal policy
proposals. Only after U.S. Representative David Cicilline opened an
investigation into digital markets and competition concerns,57 did the FTC
order leading technology companies to turn over a trove of information
related to their acquisitions during the 2010s. 58 The FTC and the DOJ
announced that the FTC would focus its investigation on Facebook and
Amazon, while the DOJ would focus on Google and Apple.59 On the same
day as the FTC announced its tech investigation, a federal judge approved

51. John Delaney’s Plan for Antitrust Policy, supra note 10.
52. Id. (Delaney also committed to extending the Clayton Act to block vertical mergers that
could have anticompetitive effects—especially so in the agricultural industry).
53. Arren Kimbel-Sannit, How Buttigieg would address rural economic issues, POLITICO (Aug.
13, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/13/buttigieg-rural-economy-iowatrip-1657909.
54. See, e.g., Food and Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2019,
infra note 78 (discussing his legislative proposals); Booker, supra note 29.
55. See, e.g., Tara Lachapelle, Trump Twists Heads with Antitrust Double Standard,
BLOOMBERG OPINION (Feb. 11 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2020-02-11/trump-contradicts-with-big-tech-t-mobile-antitrust-actions (examining
the inconsistency between the Trump administration announcing a review of recent tech mergers
and possible anticompetitive effects, but simultaneously allowing the Sprint/T-Mobile merger to
move forward—a merger the author calls “one of the most anticompetitive megadeals ever in the
tech sphere”); Kadhim Shubber, Trump administration steps up push to sway antitrust cases, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1fad936e-38a3-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4.
56. Makena Kelly, Donald Trump on tech antitrust: ‘There’s something going on’, VERGE (Jun.
10, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/10/18659619/donald-trump-facebookgoogle-amazon-apple-antitrust-european-union-eu.
57. Nancy Scola & Cristiano Lima, The House Democrat Taking on Silicon Valley, POLITICO
(Jan. 21, 2020, 7:59 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/01/21/silicon-valleycongress-big-tech-anti-trust-legislation-100217.
58. Press Release, FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftcexamine-past-acquisitions-large-technology-companies.
59. Lauren Feiner, Here’s why the top two antitrust enforcers in the US are squabbling over
who gets to regulate Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019, 10:31 AM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2019/09/18/the-ftc-and-doj-are-squabbling-over-the-right-to-regulate-big-tech.html.
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the merger of Sprint and T-Mobile, the third-and fourth-largest U.S. cell
phone carriers, with support of the DOJ.60
The White House February 2020 Economic Report of the President
outlined the administration’s priorities with respect to antitrust enforcement
and policy.61 The Report states: “[f]ederal enforcement agencies, which are
already empowered with flexible legal framework, have the tools they need
… ,[and] are well equipped to handle competition challenges posed by the
U.S. economy.”62
There have been persistent reports that President Trump attempted to
have the Time Warner/AT&T merger blocked by the DOJ due to his reported
dislike of CNN—a network owned by Time Warner. 63 In addition, a
whistleblower testified in Congress that the Antitrust Division issued
burdensome second requests to mergers and acquisitions in the cannabis
industry that otherwise posed no significant antitrust issues at the direction
of Attorney General Barr because of his personal dislike for the industry.64
These and other troubling signs suggest that political and/or personal
motivations may be driving aspects of U.S. antitrust policy under the current
administration.65
II PARTY PLATFORMS
Party platforms are another source of material that indicates the general
level of attention to antitrust issues in electoral politics. Although platform
positions often tend to be rather neutral designed to appeal to all, the language
demonstrates a disconnect between the parties on these issues. Although both
parties supported the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws (for very

60. Taylor Telford, Sprint, T-Mobile deal wins judicial approval, ushering in a new era of
telecom behemoths, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020, 12:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2020/02/11/sprint-t-mobile-deal-wins-judicial-approval-ushering-new-era-telecombehemoths/.
61. See generally Economic Report of the President, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2020), https:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2020-Economic-Report-of-the-PresidentWHCEA.pdf.
62. Id. at 200.
63. Hadas Gold, Report: Trump asked Gary Cohn to block AT&T/Time Warner merger, CNN
BUS. (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/04/media/att-time-warner-trumpgary-cohn/index.html; Ryan Goodman, 11 Top Antitrust Experts Alarmed by Whistleblower
Complaint Against A.G. Barr—and Office of Professional Responsibility’s Opinion, JUST SECURITY
(June 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71059/top-antitrust-lawyers-assess-john-eliaswhistleblower-complaint-against-a-g-barr-including-office-of-professional-responsibilitys-letter/.
64. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Political Interference and Threats to Prosecutorial
Independence: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 116th Cong. (June 24, 2020)
(statement of John W. Elias, Career Employee, Department of Justice), https://judiciary.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/elias_written_testimony_hjc.pdf.
65. See generally Spencer Weber Waller & Jacob E. Morse, The Political Misuse of Antitrust:
Doing the Right Thing for the Wrong Reason, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L (July 16, 2020),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-political-misuse-of-antitrust-doing-the-rightthing-for-the-wrong-reason/.
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different reasons), antitrust fell off the Republican agenda starting in the
Reagan era.
The last time the Republican Party had anything substantive, or positive,
to say about antitrust was 1976 when the party platform stated:
The Republican Party believes in and endorses the concept that the
American economy is traditionally dependent upon fair competition in the
marketplace. To assure fair competition, antitrust laws must treat all
segments of the economy equally. Vigorous and equitable enforcement of
antitrust laws heightens competition and enables consumers to obtain the
lowest possible price in the marketplace.66

After 1976, there was silence on the issue except in 1992 when the
Republican platform identified antitrust enforcement with problematic
government regulation and pledged: “We will modify outdated antitrust rules
that prohibit hospitals from merging their resources to provide improved,
cost-effective health care.”67
The 2016 Republican platform did not include any direct mention of
antitrust.68 In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Republican party
announced that they would not draft a new platform but would roll over the
2016 platform verbatim.69
In contrast, the 2016 Democratic platform contained a general section
entitled “Promoting Competition by Stopping Corporate Concentration.”
That section stated:
Large corporations have concentrated their control over markets to a greater
degree than Americans have seen in decades—further evidence that the
deck is stacked for those at the top. Democrats will take steps to stop
corporate concentration in any industry where it is unfairly limiting
competition. We will make competition policy and antitrust stronger and
more responsive to our economy today, enhance the antitrust enforcement
arms of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), and encourage other agencies to police anti-competitive practices in
their areas of jurisdiction. We support the historic purpose of the antitrust
laws to protect competition and prevent excessively consolidated economic
and political power, which can be corrosive to a healthy democracy.

66. The American Presidency Project, Republican Party Platform of 1976, U.C. SANTA
BARBARA (Aug. 18, 1976), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-partyplatform-1976.
67. The American Presidency Project, Republican Party Platform of 1992, U.C. SANTA
BARBARA (Aug. 17, 1992), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-partyplatform-1992.
68. The American Presidency Project, 2016 Republican Party Platform, U.C. SANTA BARBARA
(July 18, 2016), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2016-republican-party-platform.
69. Alison Durkee, The GOP Won’t Bother to Write a New Platform for 2020, VANITY FAIR
HIVE (June 12, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/republican-party-keeping-2016platform-2020.
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We support reinvigorating DOJ and FTC enforcement of antitrust laws to
prevent abusive behavior by dominant companies, and protecting the public
interest against abusive, discriminatory, and unfair methods of commerce.
We support President Obama’s recent Executive Order, directing all
agencies to identify specific actions they can take in their areas of
jurisdiction to detect anticompetitive practices—such as tying
arrangements, price fixing, and exclusionary conduct—and to refer
practices that appear to violate federal antitrust law to the DOJ and FTC.70

The official 2020 Democratic Party Platform includes reference to
perceived threats to competition in discrete industries and also takes aim at
policies adopted by President Trump during his tenure. The official platform,
in relevant part, reads:
Democrats are concerned that the increase in corporate concentration across
a wide range of industries, from hospitals and pharmaceutical companies to
agribusiness and retail chains, could be stifling competition and innovation
and creating monopoly conditions that harm consumers. We will direct
federal regulators to review a subset of the mergers and acquisitions that
have taken place since President Trump took office, prioritizing the
pharmaceutical, health care, telecommunications, technology, and
agricultural industries, to assess whether any have increased market
concentration, raised consumer prices, demonstrably harmed workers,
increased racial inequality, reduced competition, or constricted innovation,
and assign appropriate remedies. Democrats will direct regulators to
consider potential effects of future mergers on the labor market, on lowincome and marginalized communities, and on racial equity, as well as on
consumer prices and market competition. And as a last resort, regulators
should consider breaking up corporations if they find they are using their
market power to engage in anti-competitive activities.71

III LE ISLATI E PROPOSALS AND IN ESTI ATIONS
There has been a flurry of antitrust legislation introduced by some of the
prior Democratic candidates and other members of Congress. These
proposals range from targeted plans dealing with specific issues and
industries to broad sweeping reforms of the fundamental principles of
antitrust law and enforcement.
A P ARMA
Antitrust law has become part of the playbook of legislators to address
issues of prescription drug prices. Numerous pieces of legislation have been
introduced to combat pricing issues associated with “pay-for-delay” or
70. The American Presidency Project, 2016 Democratic Party Platform, U.C. SANTA BARBARA
(July 21, 2016), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2016-democratic-party-platform.
71. 2020 Democratic Party Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM. https://www.demconvention
.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-07-31-Democratic-Party-Platform-For-Distribution.pdf.
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“reverse payment” deals.72 In such deals, generic drug manufacturers form
agreements with their branded competitors to refrain from entering the
market for a certain period of time.73 In turn, the branded drug competitor is
able to raise or maintain price for that period of time, thereby robbing
consumers of the generic entry that normally drives down the cost of the
drug.74
Senators Amy Klobuchar and Chuck Grassley jointly introduced in 2019
the “Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act,” which
would prohibit brand name drug companies and biological product
manufacturers from paying or compensating generic drug companies or
biosimilar companies from entering the market. 75 The Senate and House
version of the bills seek to amend Section 5 of the FTC Act to make it
unlawful for brand name drug companies to pay their generic competitors to
delay entry to the market.76 The FTC would then be empowered to initiate
enforcement actions against violators and levy to bring civil penalties if
successful.77
I

A

While every major 2020 Democratic primary candidate touted some sort
of policy addressing consolidation and concentration issues in the food and
agriculture industry, Congress has paid less attention to the issue. Most
prominently, Senator Cory Booker introduced the Food and Agribusiness
Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2019. 78 The bill would
prohibit mergers of food and agribusiness firms where one firm’s annual net
sales or total assets exceed $160 million and another firm whose annual net

72. See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2019, H.R. 1499, 116th Cong.
(2019); Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S. 1416, 116th Cong. (2019); Stop
Significant and Time-wasting Abuse Limiting Legitimate Innovation of New Generics Act (Stop
STALLING Act), H.R. 2374, 116th Cong. (2019); Stop Significant and Time-wasting Abuse
Limiting Legitimate Innovation of New Generics Act (Stop STALLING Act), S. 1224, 116th Cong.
(2019); Affordable Medications Act, S. 1801, 116th Cong. (2019); Strengthening Health Care and
Lowering Prescription Drug Costs Act, H.R. 987, 116th Cong. (2019); Creating and Restoring Equal
Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2019 (CREATES Act of 2019), H.R. 965, 116th Cong. (2019).
73. Pay-for-Delay, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/
mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
74. Id.
75. See generally Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, S. 64, 116th
Cong. (2019). The companion bill was simultaneously introduced in the House. See Preserve Access
to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, H.R. 2375, 116th Cong. (2019).
76. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, S. 64, 116th Cong. § 27(d)(1)
(2019).
77. Id. §§ 27(a)(1), (f)(1).
78. Food and Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2019, S. 1596,
116th Cong. (2019). The companion bill was simultaneously introduced in the House. See Food and
Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2019, H.R. 2933, 116th Cong.
(2019).
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sales or total assets exceed $16 million.79 The bill empowers the Attorney
General with rulemaking authority in order to carry out the objectives of the
legislation. 80 The bill would also create the Food and Agriculture
Concentration and Market Power Review Commission (Commission),
which—like Klobuchar’s Office of the Competition Advocate (OCA)—
would be primarily tasked with studying the nature and consequences of
concentration in the food and agribusiness industries. 81 The Commission
would be empowered to hold hearings and collect data from other agencies
in order to achieve its statutory mandate.82
C MORE COMPRE ENSI E REFORM ILLS
In addition to industry specific reforms, there have been two broader
efforts so far to reform antitrust law and enforcement more generally. These
efforts also have been led in the Senate principally by Senators Klobuchar
and Warren.
T

K

R

Senator Amy Klobuchar has been perhaps the most active member of
Congress introducing antitrust legislation in recent years. Over the course of
the past year, Senator Klobuchar introduced four separate pieces of
legislation squarely addressing antitrust issues ranging from exclusionary
conduct to merger requirements.83
With respect to mergers, Klobuchar’s bills address both pre-merger filing
fees and post-merger activity. Klobuchar introduced legislation that would
increase merger filing fees for larger mergers between firms, while
simultaneously lowering the burden on smaller deals. 84 Moreover, the
Merger Enforcement Improvement Act would require firms that enter into
settlement agreements with the government to submit certain information to
the government for five years after the close of the deal.85 The Act would also
require the FTC and the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct
studies on institutional investors and mergers remedies.86
79. Food and Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2019, S. 1596,
116th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (2019).
80. Id. § 101(e).
81. Id. § 201.
82. Id. § 204.
83. See Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct Prevention Act of 2020, S. 3426, 116th Cong.
(2020); Monopolization Deterrence Act of 2019, S. 2237, 116th Cong. (2019); Merger Fee
Modernization Act of 2019, S. 1937, 116th Cong. (2019); Merger Enforcement Improvement Act,
S. 306, 116th Cong. (2019); Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S.
307, 116th Cong. (2019).
84. S. 1937, 116th Cong. (2019); see also S. 306, 116th Cong. (2019).
85. S. 306 116th Cong. §3 (2019). The goal of this provision is to help federal agencies
understand the impact the acquisition had on competition and requires the newly merged entity to
submit information on price, availability, quality, source, etc. of their products. See id.
86. Id. §§ 4, 5.
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Klobuchar also introduced the Consolidation Prevention and
Competition Promotion Act, which contained many of the same provisions.87
The Act tracked Klobuchar’s campaign proposal of the OCA. 88 The Act
requires companies to disclose certain information to the government after
agreeing to a settlement.89 The Act also shifts the burden of proof to merging
parties in deals of a certain size, or where the merger would result in a
significant increase in market concentration, to provide pro-competitive
justifications.90 Most significantly, and distinct from Klobuchar’s other bills,
the Act also amends the Clayton Act to prohibit mergers that would
“materially” lessen competition. 91 Similarly, the Act further amends the
Clayton Act to prohibit mergers that would give firms monopsony power.92
Shortly after dropping out of the Presidential race, Senator Klobuchar
introduced a more comprehensive antitrust reform bill. On March 10, 2020,
the eve of the shutdown of most of the U.S. economy due to COVID-19,
Senator Klobuchar offered the Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct
Prevention Act of 2020 (AECPA) cosponsored by Senators Booker and
Blumenthal.93
The AECPA deals with a broad range of antitrust issues, but not directly
with merger issues that were subject to Klobuchar’s prior proposals. The
bill’s core prohibition would make it unlawful for a person, or persons
working in concert, to engage in exclusionary conduct that presents an
appreciable risk of harming competition. 94 The key term “exclusionary
conduct” means conduct that a) materially disadvantages one or more actual
or potential competitors, or b) tends to foreclose or limit the opportunity of
one or more actual or potential competitors to compete. 95 Exclusionary
conduct is presumed unlawful if engaged in by a person, or persons acting in
concert, with a market share of greater than 50% as a seller or buyer in the
relevant market or otherwise have significant market power in the relevant
market.96
This presumption could be overcome if a defendant established by a
preponderance of the evidence that a) distinct procompetitive benefits
eliminate the risk of harm to competition; b) one or more persons (other than
the defendants) have entered the market or expanded their presence in the
market eliminating the risk of harming; or that the “exclusionary conduct
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See generally Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act, supra note 15.
Id. § 5.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 3.
Id.
Id.
Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct Prevention Act of 2020, S. 3426, 116th Cong.
(2020), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s3426/text.
94. Id. § 4(a).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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does not present an appreciable risk of harming competition.” 97 The bill
would also create civil penalties for antitrust violations of up to 15% penalty
of total U.S. revenues.98
Similarly, Senator Klobuchar’s Monopolization Deterrence Act would
provide for identical remedies for monopolization violations.99 It would grant
both the DOJ and the FTC with civil penalty authority in the amount of 15%
of all U.S. revenues or 30% of affected U.S. revenues.100 The Act would also
require the DOJ and FTC to issue guidelines how they would exercise their
civil penalty authority.101
S
R

W

D

A

M

C

A

Not surprisingly, Senator Warren prepared the most comprehensive draft
antitrust legislation. In the fall of 2019, a nearly final version of draft
legislation prepared by her Senate staff leaked to the press after being
circulated privately among the academic community.102 In part due to the
leak and the demands of the presidential campaign, the legislative package
has not yet been introduced in final form, and is now subject to further delay
as a result of COVID-19.
It is nonetheless interesting to view the wide-ranging progressive vision
underlying this draft legislation which is likely to be introduced prior to the
adjournment of this session of Congress. Published reports indicate that the
bill would ban mega mergers when a company has $40 billion or more in
annual assets or both have $15 billion or more in assets.103 In addition, the
bill would direct the retroactive review of two decades of such megamergers.104 Exceptions and defenses to the ban on mega mergers would be
limited to such issues as immediate insolvency.
Prohibitions on conduct by dominant firms would focus on entities with
market shares as low as 25%. 105 In general, the proposal would align the
treatment of powerful firms more closely with the abuse of a dominant
97. Id.
98. Id. §§ 4(a)-(b).
99. Monopolization Deterrence Act of 2019, §3(a), S. 2237, 116th Cong. (2019); See also Press
Release, Amy Klobuchar, Senator, Introduces Legislation to Crack Down on Monopolies that
Violate Antitrust Law (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
/2019/8/klobuchar-introduces-legislation-to-crack-down-on-monopolies-that-violate-antitrust-law.
100. Monopolization Deterrence Act of 2019, supra note 99 at § 3(b).
101. Id. § 4.
102. See Eric Newcomer & Joshua Brustein, Elizabeth Warren drafting legislation to reverse
‘mega-mergers’, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story
/2019-12-04/warren-drafts-legislation-reverse-mega-mergers.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Lauren Hirsch, Elizabeth Warren’s antitrust bill would dramatically enhance government
control over the biggest US companies, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/07
/warrens-antitrust-bill-would-boost-government-control-over-biggest-companies.html.
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position approach taken by the European Union. 106 Firms would have
additional restrictions on their ability to engage in predatory pricing, denial
of essential facilities, use of non-compete and no-poaching clauses, and other
behavior.107
The goals and values of antitrust would be expanded beyond the currently
predominate consumer welfare standard by requiring consideration of the
impact of challenged business conduct on entrepreneurs, innovation, privacy,
and workers. Public reports indicate that the bill, tentatively named the AntiMonopoly and Competition Restoration Act (AMCRA), is coauthored with
Representative David Cicilline, D-R.I., who chairs the antitrust
subcommittee on the House Judiciary panel. Representative Cicilline has
indicated that he will not introduce new antitrust legislation until the
investigations he is leading into the growing power of digital platforms have
concluded.108
In November the Subcommittee majority staff issuing a 449 page report
and recommendations for widespread strengthening of the antitrust laws.109
However, neither Senator Warren nor Representative Cicilline have yet
introduced any comprehensive follow-up antitrust legislation.
Whether the AMCRA or any of the other proposals will ever be enacted
into law is a different question. All the bills and proposals discussed above
face substantial hurdles if the current split in Congress continues, regardless
of the results of the next Presidential election. The most likely set of issues
to be enacted appear to be the items dealing with the pharmaceutical industry
which enjoy the broadest bipartisan legislative and executive branch support.
D CON RESSIONAL O ERSI

T AND IN ESTI ATION

Congress plays a crucial role in considering and enacting legislation in
the antitrust arena. Besides legislating, Congress also considers agency and
executive branch appointments, appropriates budgets, conducts oversight,
holds hearings, conducts investigations, issues reports, and debates antitrust
issues in committee and on the floor of the House and Senate as a part of their
full responsibilities as members of the legislative branch. In a democracy, it
is fitting that the most democratically elected branches set the fundamental
public policies and values. These policy and value choices should then be

106. Id. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Law, 52
CONN. L. REV. 123 (2020) (arguing for further harmonization of U.S. antitrust in line with
international consensus around principle of EU competition law for abuse of dominance).
107. See also End Employer Collusion Act, supra note 37.
108. Newcomer & Brustein, supra note 102.
109. Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, Majority Staff Rpt. & Recs., Subcomm. On
Antitrust, Commerc,. And Admin. Law of the Comm. On the Judic. (2020),
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implemented by skilled technocrats committed to the nonpartisan execution
of these values and policies.110
It is heartening to watch Congress take antitrust issues more seriously,
separate from what happens to any individual bill. One positive development
is the formation of a House Antitrust Caucus to bring together members with
common interests in this area. 111 Recent Senate and House hearings have
included the effects of consolidation and anticompetitive conduct in health
care markets, 112 competition in labor markets, 113 and a series of hearings
relating to competition issues in digital platforms. 114 This is a substantial
improvement from past Congresses which have too often focused on the
minutia and the parochial, as opposed to the fundamental issues of
competition law and policy.115
The most significant current Congressional antitrust initiative is the
House Antitrust Subcommittee’s ongoing investigation of digital
platforms.116 The subcommittee has conducted several rounds of hearings,
solicited the views of experts in the field, and requested numerous records
from the industry.117
While the investigation is on hiatus during the COVID-19 crisis,
observers anticipate that, when resumed, the investigation will lead to
substantial reports and additional legislative proposals. Most recently,
Representative Cicciline announced that he wanted further legislation
providing financial relief for the COVID-19 crisis to include a ban on
mergers during the pandemic except for those on the brink of collapse.118
Senator Warren and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez quickly
110. Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Democracy, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 807 (2019); Harry
First & Spencer Weber Waller, Democracy’s Antitrust Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2555–
61 (2013).
111. CPI Talks… with Representative Ro Khanna, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/cpi-talks-with-representative-ro-khanna/.
112. Diagnosing the Problem: Exploring the Effects of Consolidation and Anticompetitive
Conduct in Health Care Markets, HOUS. COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Mar. 07, 2019),
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=1976.
113. Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets, HOUS. COMM. ON
JUDICIARY (Oct. 29, 2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2241.
114. See, e.g., Field Hearing: Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 5: Competitors in the
Digital Economy, HOUS. COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Jan. 17, 2020), https://judiciary.
house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2386
115. First & Waller, supra note 110, at 2559-60.
116. Press Release, House Judiciary Committee Launches Bipartisan Investigation into
Competition in Digital Markets, HOUS. COMM. ON JUDICIARY (June 3, 2019),
https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2051.
117. See generally Digital Markets Investigation, HOUS. COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentquery.aspx?IssueID=14921 (offering various press
releases regarding the Digital Markets Investigation).
118. David McLaughlin, U.S. House Antitrust Chair Seeks Ban on Mergers During Pandemic,
Mergers & Antitrust Law News, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2020, 8:52 AM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/u-s-house-antitrust-chair-seeks-ban-on-mergers-duringpandemic.

92

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

followed up by proposing the Pandemic Anti-Monopoly Act which would
impose a moratorium on mergers deemed risky to competition until the FTC
also determines that small businesses, workers, and consumer are no longer
under severe financial distress.119
I

ANTITRUST IN CI IL SOCIETY

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate
from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians.
This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important
source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public
at large.
One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended
for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy
and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes
include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”120 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”121
Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,” 122 Zephyr
Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”123 Sally Hubbard’s “Monopolies Suck,”124 and
David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”125 On the academic side, there are a plethora
of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital
competition 126 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader
ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.127
Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the
mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse

119. Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Pandemic AntiMonopoly Act, ELIZABETH WARREN https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Merger%20
Moratorium%20One%20Pager.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
120. TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018).
121. MATT STOLLER, GOLIATH: THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY POWER AND
DEMOCRACY (2019).
122. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ARIEL EZRACHI, COMPETITION OVERDOSE: HOW FREE MARKET
MYTHOLOGY TRANSFORMED US FROM CITIZEN KINGS TO MARKET SERVANTS (2020).
123. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG
MONEY (2020).
124. SALLY HUBBARD, MONOPOLIES SUCK: 7 WAYS BIG CORPORATIONS RULE YOUR LIFE AND
HOW TO TAKE BACK CONTROL (2020).
125. DAVID DAYAN, MONOPOLIZED: LIFE IN THE AGE OF CORPORATE POWER (2020).
126. See surveyed Sean F. Ennis & Amelia Fletcher, Developing International Perspectives On
Digital Competition Policy (Center for Competition Policy and Norwich Business School, Mar. 31,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3565491.
127. RICHARD J. GILBERT, INNOVATION MATTERS: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE HIGHTECHNOLOGY ECONOMY (2020); JONATHAN A. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM, RESTORING
A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (2019); CHRIS SAGERS, UNITED STATES V. APPLE, COMPETITION IN
AMERICA (2019); R. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2016).
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magazines as The Atlantic, 128 Time, 129 New Republic, 130 American
Prospect, 131 Rolling Stone, 132 New York Times Magazine, 133 Variety, 134
National Review, 135 Foreign Policy, 136 and other policy and opinion
128. John Newman, The U.S. Forgot What Antitrust Is For, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/how-antitrust-became-pro-pollutiontool/597712/; Thomas Philippon, The U.S. Only Pretends to Have Free Markets, ATLANTIC (Oct.
29, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/europe-not-america-home-freemarket/600859/; Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon (Before You Turn 29), ATLANTIC
(July/August 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/lina-khan-antitrust/
561743/.
129. Madeline Joung, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple Could Face Antitrust
Investigations. How Do Those Work?, TIME (June 5, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://time.com/
5601245/google-amazon-facebook-apple-antitrust/; Alena Semuels, This Legal Scholar Has Some
Bold Ideas For How to Take on Major Companies Like Amazon, TIME (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://time.com/collection-post/5692977/lina-khan-next-generation-leaders/; Abagail Abrams,
Elizabeth Warren Wants to Break Up Amazon, Facebook, and Google. Experts Say That Won’t Be
Easy, TIME (Mar. 8, 2019, 10:16 PM), https://time.com/5548262/elizabeth-warren-antitrustamazon-facebook-google/.
130. Robin Kaiser-Schatzlein, How to Break Up Corporate Giants, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Nov.
19, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/155769/break-corporate-giants; Ganesh Sitaraman,
Unchecked Power, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 29, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/
152294/unchecked-power.
131. Sandeep Vaheesan, Unleash the Existing Anti-Monopoly Arsenal, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 24,
2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/unleash-anti-monopoly-arsenal/; David Dayen, Is
Trump’s Justice Department Trying to Discredit All Antitrust?, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://prospect.org/justice/trump-s-justice-department-trying-discredit-antitrust/; Sanjukta Paul,
The Double Standard of Antitrust Law, AM. PROSPECT (June 24, 2019), https://prospect.org/
economy/double-standard-antitrustlaw/#:~:text=But%20if%20the%20same%20truck,precisely%20to%20the%20same%20extent.
132. Andy Kroll, Facebook, Amazon, and Google Have a 2020 Problem, ROLLING STONE (Mar.
12, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/elizabeth-warren-bigtech-807109/; Amy X. Wang, Live Nation Halts Its War With the U.S. Government (For Now),
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 19, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/news/live-nationdepartment-of-justice-settlement-927528/; Althea Legaspi, Ozzie Osborne Files Antitrust Suit
Against AEG, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicnews/ozzy-osbourne-files-antitrust-lawsuit-against-aeg-205052/.
133. Kara Swisher, The Immunity of Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/opinion/tech-companies-coronavirus.html; Tim Wu, A
Corporate Merger Cost America Ventilators, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (APR. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/ventilators-coronavirus.html; David Streitfeld,
Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html.
134. Gene Maddus, Writers Guild Loses Bid to Toss Agencies’ Antitrust Suit [sic], VARIETY (Jan.
7, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/writers-guild-agency-antitrust-ruling1203449009/; Ted Johnson, Justice Department Warns Academy Over Potential Oscar Rule
Changes
Threatening
Netflix,
VARIETY
(Apr.
2,
2019,
11:03
AM),
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magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in
antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized
press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related
stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its
business section over a three-month period in late 2019.137 A majority of the
stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon,
and Facebook.138 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about
mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and
various smaller industries.139 This is separate from coverage during the same
period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field.
A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed
anecdotally in more business-oriented publications; more local newspapers;
as well as radio and television.140 Web pages and social media accounts on
these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.141
Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence.
Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks, there are
now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus.
These include the Open Markets Institute,142 American Antitrust Institute,143
Anti-Monopoly Fund, 144 Institute for Self-Reliance, 145 Public Citizen, 146
Public Knowledge,147 Demos,148 and the International Center for Law and
Economics.149
Antitrust is similarly flourishing as a professional and academic field.
One can see increased law school academic hiring in the field for the first
time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety
of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented. 150 Most
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143. AM. ANTITRUST INST., https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/ (last visited May 7, 2020).
144. The Anti-Monopoly Fund is a project sponsored by the Economic Security Project designed
to fund organizations whose goal is to pursue anti-monopoly enforcement and policy. See Economic
Security Project, Introducing the Anti-Monopoly Fund, MEDIUM (Oct. 17, 2019), https://medium.
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major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and
economic experts on both sides of an issue, both in the Supreme Court or the
Courts of Appeals.151
CONCLUSION
Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides
broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals
can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has
not changed.
Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the
weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a
meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the
legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed,
however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once
mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and
debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits,
journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious
proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the
current system if adopted.
This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to
fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political
economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic
concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and
even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many
proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent, at a minimum, the return
of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.
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